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THE "END RESULT" APPROACH TO PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
HAROLD M. SommRs*

T HE author advanced a proposal in 1955 that public utility rates be set without
going through the usual procedure of first finding a rate base and a rate of
return on that base.' The plan was simply to learn the amount of money needed
to maintain and enlarge the level of services and set the prices of utility services
accordingly. Some glimmerings of hope along these lines had appeared in the
decisions of a few regulatory bodies.
The past twelve years have witnessed some further encouraging developments. Regulatory agencies have shown a greater tendency to be concerned with
the "end result," the amount of money needed, even if lip service is still paid to
the ancient formula. And economists have been questioning the basic assumptions
involved in some of the steps in the old approach, particularly those concerned
with the debt-equity ratio and the pay-out ratio. There has also been increasing
attention to the possibility that the utility prices set under the traditional procedure tend to promote a misallocation of economic resources.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH

The procedure for setting prices of regulated utilities has generally been as
follows: (1) a "rate base" is found, i.e., the investment in the utility, usually the
original cost less depreciation of investment dedicated to the public use as shown
by the accounting records; (2) a rate of return that should be earned on that
investment is then determined by examination of the capital market, strongly
laced with traditional notions as to the appropriate range; (3) the rate of return
is applied to the rate base, giving a dollar amount that should be earned; (4) the
prices to be charged for the utility's services are then set at a level that is expected to yield that dollar amount of return after costs are met.
Difficulties arise at each stage in this procedure. There is a question as to
how to treat changing price levels under (1). Should we use only original cost or
should we allow reproduction cost or original cost trended for price changes?
What "rate of return" are we seeking under (2)? Do we want the rate that is
actually being earned on the investment, the rate required to retain the existing
amount of capital in the company, the rate required to prevent a "flight of
capital," the rate needed to "attract capital" for expansion and improvement, or
some other rate? And should the regulatory body accept management decisions
on how much debt and equity capital to use and how much of earnings to retain
* Dean, Division of Social Sciences and Professor of Economics, University of California,
Los Angeles; Member, New York Bar.
1. Somers, "Cost of Money" as the Determinant of Public Utility Rates, 4 Buffalo L.
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and how much to pay out? These decisions affect the computation of the average
rate of return.
When we have completed step (3) we have the total number of dollars that
should be earned. Will this be more or less than the amount required to attract
the capital needed to maintain and improve the level of utility services to consumers? In view of the competing needs for capital in the economy as a whole, is
the amount of capital attracted to the utility by the regulated return consistent
with the optimum allocation of capital throughout the economy? Are the prices of
utility services set in the final step, (4), similarly such as to leave a net amount
after costs of operation sufficient to provide the capital allocation that is consistent with consumer preferences?
These are some of the questions that are raised by the traditional approach.
II.

THE

OBLIGATION TO INVESTORS AND CONSUMERS

A problem that has plagued the commissions is what are the legitimate
interests of investors and consumers that regulation should protect? Specifically,
should the investor be protected (even if it is at the expense of the consumer)
against fluctuations in prices of capital goods and in rates of return on invest-

ment? It is in this context that questions of original cost, reproduction cost and
the like come up.
A fair return to investors is not necessarily fair to consumers.2 But what is
"fair to consumers"? Is it a return that ensures constant innovation and improve-

ment in service or merely some rate of return on past investment, regardless of
present and future consequences?
The New York Public Service Commission has not denied that it must take
account of changing economic forces but it has insisted that it must do so only
to the extent of ensuring a certain degree of stability in the dollar return, not in
the real return. The latter would require a dollar return that is high enough to
allow fully for inflation. The Commission has insisted that the investor in public
utility shares expected the former rather than the latter when he made his investment. The Commission has said:
Lest we be deliberately misunderstood, it should be made abundantly
clear that just as we cannot disregard the economic realities of our daily
business life, so also in a rate case, we must in like manner consider the
cumulative effect of current economic forces upon the company whose
rates we are fixing. Certainly the investor considers these before committing his money to the enterprise. ...
In the case of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company many of
its million and a quarter stockholders have undoubtedly been attracted
to it by reason of the past and expectation of the future continuance
of the $9 dividend. This fact has been very effective in aiding the
company in its tremendous job of financing since the last World War.
[W] ell informed [these investors] are on the matter most vital to them,
2.

See Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1941).
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namely that the past record of the company offers the prospect of a
continued annual payment in the same number of dollars. There appears
no basis for the argument that they anticipated double that number of
dollars because of the diminution in purchasing power. 3
In determining the value of a telephone company's plant, we cannot
use the standards of competition in the industry because these do not
exist. There is, however, another standard of competition and that is
competition in the money market for capital. If the rates fixed are too
low and the income is insufficient, there will be a flight of capital from
the telephone industry to other types of investment. The converse is
equally true. "Value" as used by the Legislature is the end result and
does not, as contended by the company, constitute the point of departure. 4
No regulation can be sound or effective nor can it be fair to the utility
or to its customers if made in a vacuum. Nor can it ignore the economic
facts of life such as the trends of business, of prices, or of the national
tax structure. It seems, however, that the company asks this Commission
to go one step further and to make a determination not alone in the
light of the factors which affect the business world but to adopt a
regulatory process which insures it and its equity investors (not those
from which it borrows money) a complete protection against any loss
which economic conditions may threaten. To put it another way, the
company's position goes to the extent of asking a regulatory body to
insure that equity capital devoted to a utility enterprise shall be forever
preserved in its original integrity, irrespective of the tax policies of government or fluctuations in economic conditions. It asks for its stockholders not only what is virtually a bondholder's assurance of steady
income, with more than twice the bondholder's annual percentage, but
also a hedge against inflation which is beyond the bondholder's dreams.
This is not our conception of the purpose of regulation nor, admitting
for the sake of the argument that such contemplated legal power exists;
do we believe such a result possible. Nowhere in modern economics do
we find a case where such an objective has been permanently maintained. We realize that styles change in investments as well as human
attire. We appreciate that a utility must earn an adequate amount to
make its securities attractive in the current money market. When that
test has been met our obligation in that respect has been discharged.
It is true that if inflation became completely uncontrolled all the standards of the past would become outmoded and some new standards
would be required if the extinguishment of capital savings is to be prevented. That point, however, has not been reached in this country. 5
In this statement, the Commission rejects most emphatically the contention that
3. Re New York Tel. Co., 5 P.U.R.3d 33, at 47 (1954) (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1954) [hereinafter cited as the New York Tel. Co. case; parallel citations to the separate
N.Y. Comm'n print (Case 16548) will be given in brackets following the P.U.R. report
cite] [22-231.
4. Id. at 44-45 [181.
5. Id. at 47-48 [22-23].
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the investor in utility equities is entitled to protection against inflation. It also
says:
The company ...contends ... that the investor in utility securities is
entitled to some special protection against the loss in the purchasing
power of his dollars committed to the enterprise. This contention, of
course, is made only as to the equity investor.
[t]his contention is completely rejected. The causes of inflation with
the resultant decline in the purchasing power of the dollar are not the
result of the processes of regulation but of national if not world-wide,
economic conditions....6
We find nothing in our statutes, or the reported decisions, which guarantees to the investor in utility equities insurance against the results of
economic
forces or even the political policies of any national administra7
tion.
The New York Commission here raises a basic question which economists
cannot avoid: should the shareholder or the consumer bear the price-level risk?
This question involves considerations of "economic efficiency" as well as "historical equity." The regulatory process dictates an answer that differs from the
one that would be given in the free market. By virtue of regulation, the utilities
investor is not permitted the large gains from risk that he might get elsewhere. It
is therefore consistent with optimum allocation of resources to the utilities industry (or makes the best of a bad job) to truncate the returns at the other end also
and remove some of the risks of loss or low earnings. In other words, the regulatory process truncates the returns at both ends. This may be the best way of attracting the "optimum" (actually a "second-best," but "optimum" within the fact
of regulation) amount of resources to the utilities industry in the sense of economic efficiency. The economic need for some assurances on earnings (to attract
the optimal amount of capital) is accentuated by the fact that the investor is
not protected against some capital losses, e.g., when the service is no longer
desired (as in the switch to trucks or planes instead of railroads) or where there
is a swindle (as in the collapse of utility empires in the 1930's).
The consumer is not entirely at the mercy of the utility. The regulatory body
merely sets the price of the service to be sold. It is still subject to the inexorable
law of demand. The consumer still decides how much of the service to buy. This
gives the consumer the last word, in a sense. After a certain point, a price increase
will not help and may even hurt earnings. In the case of essential utility services,
however, this point may be far above prevailing levels.
What about using the economist's approach to valuation: discounted value
of future earnings? Would this give us a "fair value"? The logical problem of
circularity of reasoning involved in setting a "fair value" rate base in this way is
apparent. The Supreme Court said in the celebrated Hope case that "rates cannot
6. Id. at 46
7.

[201.

Id. at 47 [211.
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be made to depend upon 'fair value' when the value of the going enterprise
depends on earnings under whatever rates may be anticipated." 8 In the ordinary
sense, "fair value" must depend on future earnings. Yet future earnings are to
be determined on the rate base. Thus it becomes impossible to set a "fair value"
without knowing the rates, and yet the rates are to be determined by taking
account of the "fair value" base. The same logical problems do not arise where
"fair value" is narrowly construed to mean reproduction cost or original cost
adjusted for general price changes. Prevailing prices, specific or general, can then
be used.
The earnings that prevent a flight of capital will yield a certain value for
the property but that value may not be a "fair" one from the point of view of
existing stockholders. As far as the constitutional standard is concerned, "Fair
value is no longer deemed an essential ingredient of an economic rate base for
rate-making purposes." 9
The entire issue of reproduction and original cost is of dwindling significance
if we have a sustained trend of "inflated" prices, i.e., a "once-and-for-all inflation." The difference between original cost and reproduction cost decreases as
more and more plant and equipment is replaced at "inflated" prices. This occurs
if we remain at a certain level of prices for some time, no matter how "inflated"
those prices are compared with some base period. If the inflationary "trend" continues in the sense that prices keep going up, a discrepancy between the two costs
remains and does not "dwindle."
The New York Public Service Commission pointed this out in a telephone
case: "The company's own evidence established that the ratio of reproduction
cost new to actual cost was declining. This, of course, would be true for many
reasons: the flattening out of the price curve, the continuing retirement of old
property built at low cost and large additions at current prices."' 1
This is a general situation, as may be illustrated further in the case of
Florida:
Practically all of our public utilities have expanded their facilities to
such an extent during the past five or six years that the vast majority of
the utility plant now in service has been installed at more or less inflated
prices. Consideration of reproduction cost new under such circumstances
would be little benefit to the utilities at the present time. On the other
hand, if we should enter upon a prolonged period of depression with
resulting deflated costs, a rate base predicated upon reproduction cost
new then would place most Florida public utilities in serious jeopardy.',
How can we resolve the conflicting interests of all concerned? Developments
8. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944).
9. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 581 (1945); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra note 8; Federal Power Comm'n v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1941); Cities Service Gas Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 155 F.2d 694, 701 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 773 (1946).
10. New York Tel. Co. case at 42 [14].
11. Petteway, Utility Regulatory Climate in Florida, 54 Pub. Util. Fort. 563, at 568-69
(1954).
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in the legal theory of regulation offer some hope of resorting to the market place
to accomplish this. There has been a trend away from the older constitutional
emphasis on the narrow question of confiscation of property with the concomitant
necessity of valuation of property. The newer emphasis is a broader one hinging
on the use of the police power.' 2
The constitutional prohibition against confiscation remains as a restraint. It
sets a lower limit. If a confiscation-minded commission were to claim that it was
allowing a handsome earnings ratio on what happens to be a very depressed
market value it would have to raise the "end result" at least to the confiscation
floor. The Supreme Court's holding that the "end result" has to be fair and
reasonable does not remove the prohibition against a confiscatory result. The
emphasis on "police power" rather than merely "confiscation" does not deny the
latter as a lower limit no matter what new-fangled method of rate-setting is used.
The change that has occurred is that the courts no longer are concerned only
with whether the return is above the confiscatory level but with whether there
has been a proper exercise of the police power above that level.
The meaning of the legal concept of "confiscation" in a practical economic
context is much more subtle than may appear at first blush. Paul Samuelson has
made the point effectively:
Can investors ever get their money out of a public utility? Are
there cases where such companies have been permitted to pay out
dividends in excess of earnings so as to liquidate the company? Very
few, I imagine. So the issue here is really not one of coaxing the old
money to stay, but rather of desisting from what the legal mind would
call "confiscation."
[There is] one point that tends to lessen greatly the distinction between return on old capital and needed return for new capital. Much
new equity capital is raised by issue of rights to existing shareowners
permitting them to buy new shares at less than the going market price.
This means that if a judge can force a company to issue such rights, he
can force new capital into the industry. Thus, suppose a utility is
allowed to earn only 4 per cent on its old capital of $1 million (= 1,000
shares). Suppose 8 per cent is a "more fair" rate and also the rate
needed to coax an extra $100,000 into the industry. Then if there is no
threat of forced new capital through rights, the market value of the
stock will be $500,000 and each share sells for $500. Now let rights to
buy one more share at $100 be issued to each shareholder. What will
happen?
According to my rough reckoning: (1) the old stock will fall from
$500 to $277.50 in value; (2) the rights will be worth $177.50 each;
(3) the rights will all be exercised, bringing the desired $100,000 of
capital into the industry. The new investors will receive 8 per cent on
their moneyl
At whose expense? At the expense of the ("confiscated," exploited)
12. Hon. Philip Halpern, ".S.C., Public Utilities, 1947 N.Y. Legis. Ann. 223-24.
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old members who have had their holdings (after sale of rights) reduced
from $500 per share to $277.50. This plus the $177.50 gives $455.00
or a loss of $45.00 per share-or $45,000 in all. (If any of the new 1,000
shares are held by old owners who have exercised their rights rather
than sold them the story is still the same.)
Moral: unless you can 3prevent issue of new stock, old owners can

be milked of market value.1

We are in difficulty no matter what we do with the rate base. If we merely
use original cost, we may be unfair to investors and we may not even be discharging our obligation to consumers to keep the utility a going and growing
concern that can provide the improved and expanded services that society demands. If we use either original cost trended for prices or reproduction cost,
we are taking account of inflation but are still not necessarily ensuring the
capital needed for maintenance and expansion of services to the consumer. And
we cannot use an economic concept of discounted value of future earnings since
our object is to set those earnings. Small wonder that regulatory bodies tend
to keep to one of the more restrictive concepts of rate base and pin their hopes
on the rate of return to pull their chestnuts out of the fire. No matter what
they do or fail to do along these lines, however, it may still be true that the
investor is "milked of market value," as Samuelson puts it.
III.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND PAY-OUT POLICY

In computing the rate of return on capital it is necessary to know how
much debt capital and how much equity capital is involved. The regulatory
agency has looked into the debt ratio and has set rates on the basis of a capital
structure that includes both debt and equity capital, on the assumption that
debt financing is cheaper than equity financing. The company, may, of course,
issue more shares if it wishes, but it should not then expect the utility commission to use the actual capital structure in determining how much income
should properly be provided: a hypothetical debt ratio is used for that purpose.
The California commission, for instance, has rejected the company-set priceearnings ratios and dividend yield as relevant measures in determining the cost
of money:
[E]arnings-price ratios merely reflect the prospective investors' appraisal of the market value of stock and, as such, are influenced by
prevailing market and economic conditions and the individual requirements of the purchasers. While it is true that such ratios may indicate
the terms under which a new investor might devote his money to the
business, it does not mean that they should measure the return the
applicant is entitled to receive on its investment in its properties. Certainly, the dividend rate the management has elected to establish for
13. Letter From Professor Samuelson to Harold M. Somers, August 9, 1955, commenting on latter's article, supra note 1. The letter is quoted with Professor Samuelson's
permission (May 10, 1966). It was not written with a view to publication.
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its common shares should not be used
14 in arriving at the return the consumer should pay on the rate base.
Utility commissions have been strongly impressed by the fact that the
yield on debt capital has generally been lower than that on equity capital and
that corporate dividends are derived from income that is subject to tax while
interest expense is deductible. The assumption that debt financing is cheaper
than equity financing is not necessarily valid in a growth or inflation oriented
market, as we have seen in recent years. The "Cost of Debt and Equity Money"
table below shows the change that has occurred in the relation between bond and
stock yields. A. T. & T. stock yields (column 2) were greater than bond yields
(column 1) in 1953 but the situation was reversed in 1965; similarly with
general stock (column 5) and bond (column 4) yields.
COST OF DEBT AND EQUITY MONEY
(In Percentages)
AT&T

AT&T

AT&T

General
bond

General

bond

stock

stock

yields

stock

stock

yields
(1)

yields
(2)

earnings
(3)

Aaa bonds
(4)

yields
(5)

earnings
(6)

4.89
4.43
4.48
4.24
4.51
4.43
4.86
4.55
3.86
4.43
3.22
2.97

3.1
2.8
2.8
3.1
2.8
3.5
3.8
4.6
5.3
5.1
5.0
5.4

5.18

4.50

3.30

5.06

1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
1959
1958
1957
1956
1955
1954

4.52
4.71
4.88
4.48
5.78
6.37
6.85
7.78
6.80
6.85
6.80

4.42
4.27
4.35
4.37
4.47
4.49
3.87
3.96
3.39
3.09
2.93

3.15
3.12
3.25
3.10
3.84
3.94
4.43
4.92
4.68
4.50
4.81

4.98
4.85
5.17
4.78
5.89
5.76
6.26
6.90
6.75
6.52
6.64

1953

3.26

5.7

7.25

3.24

5.33

7.35

Year
1965

Sources:
Columns
(1)

(2) (3)
(4) (5) (6)
(5)

(6)

General

AT&T bond yield computed from Moody, Bond Record, (Year End Ed.) for
each of the respective years. (In 1953 the figure of 3.26 is obtained after
dropping out three short-term bonds with yields close to 1.0%o. When these
are included the average is 2.75%.)
AT&T stock yields and stock earnings (converted from price-earnings ratios)
from Moody, Handbook of Widely Held Common Stocks.
General Public Utility bond yields, stock yields, and stock earnings (converted
from price-earnings ratios) computed from Moody, Public Utility Manual.
Moody, 24 Public Utility Stocks (not including AT&T).

Where debt capital costs in the neighborhood of only 3 1/2%, as it did in
the fifties, a larger amount of debt in the capital structure gives the appearance
of reducing the cost of capital. The cost of money derived through issuance of
debt is low relative to the cost of money derived through issuance of equities:
debt is "cheap money" and equity is "dear money." For reasons of its own
14.

Re Southern Cal. Edison Co., 6 P.U.R.3d 161 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1954).
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the company might nevertheless choose to keep the debt ratio low although
that might appear to raise the net cost of money as a whole. For example, if
debt cost 3% and equity capital costs 8% (in dividends) the sum of $1,000,000
can be raised at an average cost of 3% with 100% debt; 8% with zero debt;
6 1/3% with 33 1/3% debt; and 5.75% with 45% debt. The current payments
to debt and equity holders would be as follows to raise the $1,000,000:
Debt as a Percentage
of Total Capital

Interest and Dividend
Payments

100%
0%
33 1/3%
45%

$30,000
80,000
63,333
57,500

To take an example, the company's target in the 1954 New York Telephone case was a debt ratio of 33 1/3% while one of the commission's witnesses
used a ratio of 457o (the actual ratio at the time being 38%).115 Using the
above hypothetical figures, telephone rates would have to be high enough to
produce $63,333 for interest and dividend payments under a 33 1/3% ratio
and only $57,500 under a 457 ratio, hence the commission's concern with debt
ratio. This concern is aggravated by the fact that interest paid is deductible
while dividends paid are not (a factor which is not taken into account in the
numerical example). All this assumes that the component debt and equity yields
will not be affected by the ratio actually used, a matter which is considered later
in this section.
The regulatory body purports not to be telling the company what to do; it
is merely making some computations for purposes of rate regulation. The highest
court of New Mexico has stated, "Debt ratio is strictly a matter for management,
but its evaluation in fixing rates is an item for serious consideration by the ratemaking body."' 0 But does not the use of a hypothetical debt ratio in rate-making necessarily put pressure on management to change the debt ratio in a direction which (judged by its action) it considers undesirable? The company is
treated as if it had a less expensive capital structure than it actually has. It
is penalized for its managerial decision.
In sum, one may raise a question concerning a regulatory commission's refusal to accept the utility company's existing or prospective debt ratio as the
15. New York Tel. Co. case at 50 [26-27, 30]. In an earlier case the commission refused to use a hypothetical capitalization: Re New York Tel. Co., 84 P.U.R. (n.s.) 267, 290
(1950).
16. State Corp. Comm'n v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 58 N.M. 260, 270 P.2d
685 (1954). The actual capital structure is generally favored by Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado
and Connecticut according to Rose, "Cost of Capital" in Public Utility Rate Regulation,
43 Va. L. Rev. 1079, 1087 n.27 (1957).
A hypothetical capital structure is generally favored by District of Columbia, Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin and Massachusetts. Id. at 1085-86
n.21.
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basis for the computation of rate of return. The commission substitutes its own
judgment as to capital structure of the management's judgment. It does not
interfere with wages paid, why interfere with the relative amounts of interest
and dividends paid? Since debt ratio is unquestionably a matter on which
reasonable men may differ, and comes well within the scope of managerial discretion, there is doubt whether the commission should attempt to impose its
own judgment in a question of this sort.1 7 The problem admittedly becomes
more complicated where a holding company decides on the debt-equity ratio of
a subsidiary whose rates are regulated.
Another important question is whether the debt and equity yields will
stand still while we change the debt/equity ratio. The actual debt ratio may
affect the cost of money if investors are influenced by the ratio in deciding
how much to pay for a given stock. Perhaps a low debt ratio gives a prospective
buyer of stock a greater feeling of confidence in stability of dividends with the
result that he is willing to pay a high enough price so that a $10 dividend, say,
represents merely a 5% cost of equity capital. Thus a low debt ratio may
actually lower the total cost of money if it lowers the cost of equity capital
sufficiently. (It may also lower the cost of money by lowering the cost of debt
money: the less debt, the more security the creditors have for the debt outstanding.)
It has not been at all evident, therefore, that a regulatory body's insistence
on a high debt has actually favored low telephone rates. The New York Commission recognized this possibility by saying, "If, as the company contends,
this [constant decline in the debt ratio] produces an added margin of safety,
it should also have a tendency to reduce the required rate of return"; 18 and
"Too high a debt ratio as a long time policy may well be as expensive as too low
a one."''19 The more serious problem of reorganization or bankruptcy in case of
a serious decline in business should also be considered by regulating agencies.
The fixed obligation of debt may lead to drastic legal consequences compared
with the flexibility inherent in equity capital. Although a telephone company
is relatively invulnerable to such contingencies, they cannot be ignored in
rate-making in general.
The hypothetical adjustment of the capital structure by the regulatory
agency thus involves more than an interference with the reasonable exercise
of managerial discretion. There is a basic fallacy involved, leading to an incorrect answer: The existing debt ratio affects the interest-yield and the earnings-yield. A different debt ratio would result in a different interest-yield and
a different earnings-yield. Thus all the components in the cost of money com17. Somers, supra note 1, at 304; 55 Pub. Util. Fort. at 790.
18. New York Tel. Co. case at 55 [341.
The Pennsylvania commission has stated that the cost of common stock capital generally
tends to decrease in relation to significant increases in the proportion of common equity
in the capital structure. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Ellwood Consol. Water Co.,
6 P.U.R.3d 377 (1955).
19. New York Tel. Co. case at 49 [25].
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putation would be different, not only the debt ratio. The agencies change the
weighting only and apply the existing debt interest-yield and equity earningsyield to obtain the new hypothetical cost of money on the assumption that
this is the cost of money that would exist if the hypothetical debt ratio existed.
If the agency is going to change the capital structure (debt ratio) it must seek
expert testimony as to what the new interest-yield and earnings-yield would be
(if such testimony is available) before making the arithmetic computation that
leads to the cost of money figureY°
Modigliani and Miller have built on these considerations and carried them
to their logical extreme. 21 To them it does not matter what the capital structure
is, the overall cost of capital would be the same. For regulated industries, this
means that the three elements in the weighted cost of money computationratio of debt to equity, debt interest-yield and equity earnings-yield-all adjust
to one another for a particular company so that any change in debt-equity ratio
leads to offsetting changes in the respective yields so as to leave the weighted
computation of cost of money unchanged. If this exact adjustment occurs the
regulatory agencies are wasting their time in changing the ratio and getting
the appropriate individual debt and equity yields: the answer is the same as the
one they started with, the actual cost of money under the management-determined debt ratio. Whether the limiting case of Modigliani and Miller actually
prevails in practice is currently the subject of much discussion among economists.

22

In any case, the regulatory agencies get the wrong answer when they
change the debt ratios. They fail to take account of resulting changes in debt
and equity yields. If it should happen that those yields always adjust so as to
leave the weighted cost of capital unchanged, the agencies would be wasting
their time even if they tried to get the right answer. The newly computed cost
of capital would always be the same as the existing cost of capital. If it should
happen that the yields do change but not in an exactly counteracting manner,
the correct answer could be obtained only through expert testimony on the
appropriate yields on debt and equity under the hypothetical debt ratio. The
20. Somers, supra note 1, at 304; 55 Pub. Util. Fort. at 790.
21. Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, CorporationFinance and the Theory of
Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261 (1958).
22. See Rose, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment:
Comment, 49 Am. Econ. Rev. 638 (1959) ; Durand, The Cost of Capital, CorporationFinance
and the Theory of Investment: Comment, 49 Am. Econ. Rev. 639 (1959); Modigliani &

Miller, The Cost of Capital, CorporationFinance and the Theory of Investment: Reply, 49
Am. Econ. Rev. 655 (1959); Weston, The Management of Corporate Capital: A Review
Article, 34 J. of Bus. 129 (1961); Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and Valuation of Shares, 34 J. of Bus. 411 (1961) ; Barges, The Effect of Capital Structure on the Cost
of Capital (1963); Modigliani & Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital:
A Correction, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 433 (1963) ; Weston, A Test of Cost of Capital Propositions,
30 So. Econ. J. 105 (1963); Friend & Puckett, Dividends and Stock Prices, 54 Am. Econ.
Rev. 656 (1964). The last has references to several other participants in the discussion, including Gordon, Fisher, Benishay, Lintner and Solomon. See also Wippern, FinancialStructure

and the Value of the Firm, 21 J. of Fin. 615 (1966).
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practice of changing the debt ratios while using the prevailing interest and
earnings yields can only lead to an unrealistic and irrelevant result.
Another factor related to the cost of money is the surplus to be accumulated, i.e., the earnings that are to be permitted over and above the dividends
paid out: "[I]t is very unlikely that utility management would be-permitted
to dictate its own rate of return by the automatic process of dividend declaration-thus equating the common dividend rate paid with the cost of equity
23
capital.1
A commission witness argued for an 80% pay-out in the New York Telephone case of 1955, a company witness for a 65% pay-out. If it is settled how
much has to be paid out, such as $9 per share (at that time), the 80% figure
would require net earnings of about $11 per share while the 65% figure would
require net earnings of approximately $14 per share. The crucial question is
this: Will the prospective investor be influenced by the amount of reserve that is
being built up, i.e., by the surplus being accumulated, in short, by the pay-out
ratio? For example, would Ae not be willing to invest $100 on the basis of receiving $8 a share if he knows that surplus of $6 is being reserved; even though
he insists on $9 a share if only $3 is being reserved? In short, does not the payout ratio affect the cost of money? This is a question of fact, and one that is
difficult to settle. One would certainly expect an investor to be influenced by
the surplus, which increases the book value of the shares, but to what extent
is he actually influenced? The New York commission says, "All witnesses agree
that the principal consideration governing the market price of the company's
stock is the amount of dividends paid (coupled of course with a reasonable
assurance that payment will be continued) and that retained earnings do not
'24
substantially contribute to the market price of the stock."
The commission undertook a detailed examination of the surplus necessary
to ensure reasonable stability in the $9 dividend which then prevailed. For instance, it questioned the conservative investment policy of the pension fund.
This might appear remote from the question of cost of capital but the commission justified its approach by stating that the company's payments to the fund
are increased as a result of the conservative investment policy and the increased
payments cut into potential surplus. The company asks, in effect, that the cost
of accumulating the surplus be taken into account in setting utility rates. The
commission said, "Under the law we can properly disallow in fixing rates any
wasteful or unnecessary expense of operation. Clearly, since the cost of capital
is such an expense, it is our duty to determine what costs in obtaining money
25
lie within the realms of reason.1
The above discussion is in terms of market price of the stock but it can
readily be translated into the amount of dividend that has to be paid per share
23. Nichols & Welch, Ruling Principles of Utility Regulation: Rate of Return [hereinafter cited Ruling Principles]Supplement A, 71 (1964).
24.
25.

New York Tel. Co. case at 51 [29).
Id. at 49 [29].
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in any new financing. If the market price goes up because of a large surplus, the
cost of money is lower because the company is receiving more dollars for each
share for which it pays the given dividend. If the market price goes down the
cost of money is higher because the company is receiving fewer dollars for each
share for which it pays the given dividend.
The difficulty in tampering with the pay-out ratio, like tampering with
the debt ratio, is that a change in the ratio may change the relevant variables.
Retained earnings affect stock prices and dividends affect stock prices. The
relative strengths of the two effects has been the subject of continuing investigation. 20 We cannot blithely change the dividends/earnings ratio and ignore the
possible effects on the market price of the stock, hence on the relevant yields in
a rate-of-return computation of cost of money. The hypothetical pay-out ratio is
inconsistent with the actual stock prices-hypothetical stock prices would also
have to be used.
Paul Samuelson foreshadowed some of the recent statistical results in 1955:
I believe there is some considerable reason to think that plowed
back earnings do add materially to a stock's present price by enhancing
its future attractiveness... [M]y final impression based on investigation and reading is something like the following:
People like present and future dividends; if they have reason to
think that withholding present dividends from them will give them
substantial future dividends which will be reflected in higher future
prices (and in lightly taxed capital gainsl), they will gladly forego
present dividends and bid up the present price of a heavy
27 plow-backer
of earnings. (E.g., Amerada Petroleum, IBM, etc. etc.)
It is interesting to contrast the "hands-off" policy in the matter of wages
with the commissions' willingness to intervene in company decisions on capital
structure (debt ratio and reserves) affecting the cost of money. The New York
commission says,
when an obligation has been incurred under which the employees of any
company have vested rights, this Commission has no authority in law
to revise the bargain and to take from labor that to which it is contractually entitled.
Here [with respect to reduced telephone rates to employees], as in the
discussion on pensions, interference with the judgment of management
would be injecting the Commission into what amounts to the company's
present contract of employment.
This Commission has repeatedly asserted its position that it not interfere with the collective bargaining rights which have become inherently
26. See, e.g., Johnson, Shapiro & O'Meara, Valuation of Closely-Held Stock for Federal

Tax Purposes: Approach to an Objective Method, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 166 (1951); Friend &
Puckett, Dividends and Stock Prices,supra note 22.
27. See Letter, supra note 13.
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part of our American system and that any payment or benefit given
labor, in the absence of proof
28 of bad faith, is presumptively a proper
expenditure for fixing rates.
One may commend an agency for the respect it accords wage commitments and managerial judgment concerning them. Is it clear, however, that
similar respect should not be accorded managerial judgment in "cost of money"
items such as capital structure, debt ratio, pay-out ratio and the like?
Samuelson has presented a persuasive argument that tends to support the
distinction made by regulatory agencies:
It may be right for a judge to let a utility decide its wage policies. But
if the judge is guaranteeing the utility a certain fixed return on its
equity capital, or a fixed return on all its capital, then it is manifestly
in the utility's self-interest to inch up on the amount of its equity capital
and to play down its loan capital. Why? To answer this ask why equity
capital rates have to be higher than debt rates [in 1955]. Obviously,
because of the extra risks. What increases the risks on equity capital
so as to justify a higher rate? Pyramiding debt capital on top of it. I
assure you that as a rational investor who requires an 8 per cent return
on my investment when it is margined by say an equal amount of debt,
I would love to have a judge let me invest more at the same high rate,
substituting it for debt. The overall costs to the consumer of course
would go up-the increase in my happiness can come from no other
source. Admittedly, it is hard to know where to draw the exact line....
But to let an interested party draw the line defining his own advantage
-that's bad economics and, I dare say, bad law. (In the case of wages,
we think that it is to the interest of the employer to strike the same
bargain that the judge would have him strike; otherwise we'd become
paternalistic and refuse him the right to make this decision.) 2 9

IV.

THE "END RESULT" APPROACH

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has said: "fair value is the end product and not the means of the rate-making process.1 30 This conclusion is fully
consistent with the "end result" approach under which the emphasis is on setting earnings at an appropriate level rather than on finding an appropriate base.
In the exercise of the state's police power, the commission is bound to determine rates that are "just and reasonable." It is restrained by the requirements of
substantive as well as procedural due process. Does a "just and reasonable" rate
necessarily have to be based on investment cost, fair value or other specific
base? The Supreme Court of Utah has answered this question in the negative.
The court has said:
The statute cannot be construed as requiring the Commission to fix
utility rates on a value rate base. The legislature gave full rate-making
power to the Commission subject only to the limitations of procedural
New York Tel. Co. case at 57-58 (39].
See Letter, supra note 13.
30. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 155 F.2d 694, 701 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 773 (1946).
28.
29.
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due process and the requirement that the rate established be just and
reasonable. This standard "just and reasonable" has been held to be the
same as the constitutional standard. Federal Power Commission v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. (1942) 315 U.S. 575 ... At the time of Smyth
v. Ames a rate could not be just and reasonable in the constitutional
sense unless it permitted a fair return on fair value. This concept has,
as pointed out above, been overruled. It would be contrary to common
sense to hold that the legislature meant "just and reasonable" only as
defined by the courts at the time of Smyth v. Ames and to hold that
the legislature would, in order to authorize the Commission to use prudent investment, be required to reenact the statute saying that it meant
"just and reasonable" as that term is construed today. To the contrary,
it must be assumed that the legislature contemplated that the concept
of that which is "just and reasonable" might change with social trends. 31
Does this emphasis on "just and reasonable" rates open the field wide to an
almost unlimited use of discretion by the commission? Is there no need for the
commission to bother with a rate base and rate of return; can it go directly to a
"just and reasonable" utility rate structure? Considerable authority can be
garnered for an affirmative answer to these questions.
We must caution that the Hope case was concerned with a federal regulatory
body and with a federal statute which prescribed "just and reasonable" rates.
The likelihood is strong that in such a situation the rigamarole of rate base and
rate of return might be dispensed with. What the Supreme Court would do in
reviewing a state court's review of a state administrative agency's application
of a state statute requiring consideration of "value of property," "cost of property," "rate of return" or "rate base" might be another matter.
If our interpretation of the Hope decision is valid, that decision cannot be
considered a bar to the simpler approach to rate-making suggested here: first to
determine the number of dollars of income required to ensure adequate capital
and then to set utility rates that will yield that income. Rate base and rate of
return would be ignored in the absence of an explicit statutory requirement that
they be considered.
It is submitted that the United States Supreme Court might find that a
total absence of rate base is consistent with its decision in the Hope case and
safeguards both procedural and substantive due process, provided that an
adequate factual basis exists otherwise for the utility rates that are established.
The Court said in that case,
the Commission was not bound to the use of any single formula or combination of formulae in determining rates ...

And when the Commis-

sion's order is challenged in the courts, the question is whether that
order "viewed in its entirety" meets the requirements of the [Natural
Gas] Act ...

Ufider the statutory standard of "just and reasonable"

it is the result reached not the method employed which is controlling
...It is not the theory but the impact of the rate order which counts.
31. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 107 Utah .155, 152 P.2d 542

(1944).
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If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and
unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end.32
The rate base and rate of return are supposed to be determined independently. But a hint that the New York Commission has one eye on the rate base
while it is independently computing the rate of return was contained in a case in
which it said, "Under all the facts and circumstances we find that a return
computed on an original cost rate base less depreciation reserves as of this time
would be in the vicinity of 6 per cent. We make no finding as to the proper rate
'33
of return upon any other form of rate base.
But if the commission wished to take account of the necessity of attracting
capital in determining the proper rate of return on original cost, the earnings and
dividends in relation to the market prices of the equity securities are pertinent,
rather than earnings or dividends as a percentage of original cost. "Cost of
money" cannot be determined initially in relation to original cost even if it is to
be translated later into a rate of return on the original cost.
Once we take as our aim the attraction of future capital to the utilities we
are in the complicated realm of the inducement to invest. What induces a person
to invest in a particular line of business? To what extent will a future investor be
influenced by how past investors have been treated? 34 There is no denying that
the two are closely related. Bygones are gone in economic theory but they are
not forgotten by investors. 35 The final test is what the investor does when he is
offered utility shares. It is a difficult test yet it is the one which must be met in
setting the prices of utility services with due regard to the problem of keeping
or attracting capital.
A case in point is the treatment of inflation. To say that evidence of inflation
will be used in setting the rate of return to be applied to the cost of the property
does not guarantee that the inflation in plant and equipment is actually taken
into account in any way by reference to the capital market. High percentage rates
of return on equities do not necessarily accompany high plant and equipment
prices. The fundamental difference is this: the current rate of return on equity
capital is influenced by future inflationary and growth prospects among other
things; the fact that prices of plant and equipment are now high compared with
some past period may not be reflected fully or at all in the current rate of return
on equities; and there may even be an inverse relation between the two. Thus
consideration of current equipment price levels compared with past price levels
32. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) (Emphasis added and citations omitted.).
33. Re New York Tel. Co., 91 P.U.R. (n.s.) 231, at 267 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1951).
Cf. id. at 269 [N.Y. Comm'n print (Case 15235) p. 40. Cf. id. at 42] (Emphasis added.).
34. Rose, The Bell Telephone System Rate Cases, 37 Va. L. Rev. 699, 715 n.57 (1951),
labels as "sound economic principle" a statement that "the only significant cost at the present
time is that economic cost which is established by the marginal productivity of the capital in
alternative employment in the immediate future."
35. Somers, A Theory of Income Determination,58 J. Pol. Econ. 523, 539 (1950).
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does not necessarily show up in the rate of return nor does it give the utilities
relief from the problems caused by inflation.
In summary, equipment price increases that have occurred are not reflected
in the regulated rate of return insofar as the latter is based on the "cost of
money." 36 If an original cost rate base is also used, inflation in plant and equipment prices appears nowhere in the computation unless the rate of return is somehow "adjusted" with an eye to the problem of inflation by achieving an appropriate "end result."
The New York Commission has alluded to this in saying:
If a rate base be used which is a matter of speculative judgment to
which is applied a rate of return which is always a matter of opinion,
both are arguable variables. With the use of an investment rate base,
the property account is rarely in dispute. The answer as to the required
number of dollars of income should be the same irrespective of the
result can be more accurately reached
formula used. We think the end
by the method we have used. 37
Here there is a clear admission of the fact that the "required number of
dollars of income" is the figure to be determined. Since the needed end result,
the "required number of dollars of income" has to be determined independently
anyway, why bother with going through the process subsequently of rationalizing
that number by setting a rate base and rate of return?
The commission is right in saying that the use of an investment base reduces
the number of items to be argued about; or one might say that it concentrates
the argument into the rate of return. Since the only ground on which to argue
about rate of return stems from the desired level of utility income, the total
amount of argument is set by the latter. The only remaining question is how to
distribute the argument, whether to split it between the base and the rate of
return or whether to use a non-arguable base and therefore concentrate the
argument on the rate of return. The futility of this process is clear. Since the
"required number of dollars of income" is considered necessary and the only
thing necessary to set the utility rates, the subsequent hindsight derivation of
those dollars by applying some rate of return to some rate base is so much wasted
motion.
The question that arises is whether any rate base is needed in a consistent
application of the "flight of capital" rule of rate-making. The aim is to set a rate
which will result in earnings which will prevent a flight of capital from the business. The process of setting a rate base and then a rate of return is an unnecessary
carryover from the old "fair value" days. Whatever the base, the rate of return
will presumably be set so as to result in sufficient earnings to meet the "flight of
capital" test. Why then go through the unnecessary motions of setting a base and
36. See Bonbright, Utility Rate Control Reconsidered in the Light of the Hope Natural
Gas Case, 38 Am. Econ. Rev. 465 (1948). Cf. 2 Bonbright, Valuation of Property 1078-1165
(1965 reprint).
37. New York Tel. Co. case at 46 [20] (Emphasis added.).
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a rate of return? Why not just decide on the level of earnings which will pay
interest on debt and give an adequate return to the equity securities so as to
make them sufficiently attractive in the capital market? Much wasted effort
would be eliminated and all parties would understand clearly what is involved.
Motions for introduction of evidence on reproduction cost would no longer have
to be denied-they would not have to be made in the first place. The evidence to
be submitted and considered would be concerned with "cost of money," i.e., the
yield on equity securities that would be necessary to attract capital. From that,
together with data on the capital structure (actual or hypothetical-a point to
be settled) could be determined the total desirable earnings. This could then be
translated into a structure of prices of utility services.
It should be pointed out that the device of going directly to the amount of
return instead of using a rate base and rate of return should not be confused
with the procedure of setting utility rates without any factual basis whatever.
Under the Hope decision, the precise path taken by the administrative agency is
left open (barring a controlling statutory requirement) as long as there is no
abuse of the police power. Just as both original cost and reproduction are consistent with the Hope decision, so are other reasonable methods of arriving at the
"end result."
Some state courts have held that some rate base is still necessary. 38 There is
nevertheless much emphasis on the "end result." In a New Hampshire case, for
example, the Public Service Commission set utility rates after a balancing of a
great many factors. The court stated, "We know, however, that as a practical
matter it is the number or amount of dollars that a utility is permitted to earn
that is important. Rate bases and rates of return are without significance except
39
as related to each other."
The court denies that the commission is no longer bound to disclose the
"method employed." It refers to the fact that in the Hope case and in subsequent
decisions, "the findings of the regulatory body whose orders were sustained disclosed a rational process by which a rate base and a rate of return were determined and applied, to produce the return translated into rates ....
)"
The
emphasis is on a "rational process" and on a disclosure of "method employed"
to reach the prescribed rates, so that "the validity of its conclusions may be
tested upon judicial review." 4' There is actually no requirement in this case that
the old formula of rate base and rate of return be used.
The "cost of money" approach is surely a rational process capable of
38. Rose, supra note 34, at 702 n.12, cites a number of cases which indicate that "some
rate base appears still essential." See Ruling Principles at 80-86, for states in which cost
of money is only one of the factors considered.
39. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State, 95 N.H. 353, at 355, 64 A,2d 9, at 12 (1949)
(Emphasis added.). See Note, State Public Service Commission Required To Adopt Rate Base
Method in DeterminingTelephone Rates, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1247 (1949).

40. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State, supra note 39 at 357, 64 A.2d at 12 (Citations omitted.).
41. Ibid.
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judicial review. It is only after reference to the New Hampshire Revised Statutes
Annotated section 292.28 (1966) which speaks of "a reasonable return on the
cost of the property" that the court decides, "in this case, a definite finding by
the commission of the base upon which the company is entitled to a return is
required by New Hampshire law."142 Again, when the court speaks more generally
it merely says, "In our opinion, the relief furnished by the Hope case from the
constitutional restrictions of a formula, do not operate to relieve the Commission
of the duty to make findings of fact essential to permit review of its conclusions." 43 There is no reference here to rate base or rate of return. There is even
a suggestion that another method might be acceptable if an adequate record
were made: "The record appears to afford no basis for determination of a proper
' 44
return by any process other than the usual rate base method.
In a Wisconsin case the commission's findings of fact were simply the
following:
1. That the existing rates applicable to the service furnished by Commonwealth Telephone Company by and through the facilities of its
Two Rivers exchange afford an excessive profit to said utility and
are therefore unreasonable.
2. That45the rates herein prescribed for such services are just and reasonable.

It need hardly be pointed out that the court is not here holding that the
traditional method of rate base and rate of return is necessary. The court did
make a refereAce to rate base by asking, "How can the Commission or the reviewing court or the utility or the public determine whether the profit is proper
unless the Commission makes specific findings of the 'relevant facts and circumstances'? The Commission must determine what those are and set them forth as
required by law. Those essential facts which control each case will then determine the rate base." 46
The reference to "rate base" here appears to be incidental, the main plaint
being that there were no specific findings of the "relevant facts and circumstances." The final holding is that "the present method of the Commission is
improper and must be abandoned." 47 There is no specific holding that there must
be a rate base and rate of return.
In a Vermont case the court also referred to the necessity of a rate base.
Much of its concern was, however, with the commission's failure to make adequate
findings on matters of expense. This is not a problem of rate base but one which
arises under an "end-result" approach as well, since the expense item is the
42.

Ibid.

43. Id. at 359, 64 A.2d at 15.
44. Id. at 360, 64 A.2d at 16.
45. Commonwealth Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 252 Wis. 481-82, 32 N.W.2d 247
(1948).
46. Id. at 484, 32 N.W.2d at 248.
47. Id. at 485, 32 N.W.2d at 249. But see Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp. v.
Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 13 Wis. 2d 384, 108 N.W.2d 729 (1961), requiring rate base
upon which to calculate return.
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connecting link between the amount of return (however arrived at) and the
utility prices themselves (since the amount of net profit plus expenses equals
gross receipts). The Hope case was cited simply to the effect that it "did not
change this rule [a proper rate base and allowable expenses] for ... this case did
not reject judicial right of review as to reasonableness of rates and, obviously, if
it be held that no yardstick is necessary whereby to test this question then
judicial review as to reasonableness of rates would become utterly meaningless." 48
It cannot be assumed that the Vermont court would have insisted on a determination of rate base if the other parts of the commission's findings of fact were
adequate to an evaluation of the reasonableness of the rates.
In recent years, the Louisiana commission has held that the use of a cost of
money approach may dispense with rate of return and rate base, 40 except where
shares are not traded in the open market.50
Florida apparently has accepted this interpretation fully:
The Florida commission has never been greatly concerned over the rate
of return. It has been much more interested in the dollar requirements
of the utility. How many dollars does the utility requirein order to meet
its operating expenses, depreciation charges, taxes, maintenance expense,
debt service, dividend requirements, and transfer a reasonable amount
to surplus? When the commission has been able to determine the answer
to this question then the rate of return becomes a simple matter of
computation. 51
The wasted motion involved in the traditional procedure was demonstrated in
a very frank and open manner in a Nebraska decision which first set the earnings
and then computed various possible rates of return on various possible rate bases.
It found that:
1. Annual net telephone earnings in the amount of $2,127,022 is a fair
and reasonable return to the applicant and would enable the company to pay its debt charges and a reasonable dividend on its stock
and provide a reasonable amount for surplus and that such a return
upon investment would attract the capital required for plant additions and improvements.
2. An annual return of $2,127,022 is equivalent to a rate of return of
5.97 per cent on a rate base of $35,635,849 or 4.44 per cent on a
rate base of $47,868,640, or 6.05 per cent on a rate base of
$35,157,936, or 6.27 per cent on a rate base of $33,916,742, and that
the respective rate of return on any of these bases is fair and reasonable. 52
These findings should be framed and hung on the wall in the offices of all public
48. Re New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 115 Vt. 494, at 499, 66 A.2d 135, at 138 (1949).
49. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 14 P.U.R.3d 146
(1956); Ex parte Oak Grove Water Co., 26 P.U.R.3d 549 (1958); Re United Gas Pipe Line
Co., 38 P.U.R3d 209 (1961).
50. Lx parteMorehouse Nat. Gas Co., 48 P.U.R.3d 375 (1963).
51. Petteway, supra note 11 at 569 (Emphasis added.).
52. Re Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. (Nebraska State Ry. Comm'n) 5 P.U.R3d 24, 30
(1954).
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utility commissions. They might save the parties a great deal of expense and
mental anguish.
The suspicion that many commissions have recently been adopting an "end
result" approach without openly admitting it is confirmed by the following
observers.
Bonbright says:
In the opinions that accompany their rate orders, commissions seldom attempt to disclose the reasons why they find, say, 5.85 per cent fair
in one case and 6.2 percent fair in another. Especially in fair-value jurisdictions, some of the decisions lead one to suspect that the commissions
have first reached a conclusion as to reasonable revenue requirements in
terms of dollars per annum and then have proceeded to translate these
requirements into whatever combination of a rate base and a percentage
to pass muster with the appellate courts or
rate of return will be likely
53
with public sentiment.
Phillips says: "I suspect that many commissions come close to using such
an approach at the present time, i.e., that the rate base and rate of return are
determined after the cost of capital. (At least one West Virginia commissioner
told me recently that his Commission follows such a procedure.)" 54
V.

PROBLEMS WITH THE "END RESULT" APPROACH

Our proposed rule is, decide on the level of earnings which will pay interest
on debt and give an adequate return to the equity securities. There are several
steps that have to be taken to make this rule operational.
(1) The "cost of money" (e.g., earnings-price ratio) should be averaged
over some period, as in prevailing practice where cost of money evidence is used
in deciding on the appropriate rate of return (to be applied to a rate base). The
momentary cost of money or the cost of money which happens to prevail at the
time of the rate hearings is certainly not appropriate. Otherwise the frequent
changes that occur in overall interest rates and in business expectations would
make a shambles of utility price-making. Changing monetary policy will still
leave its mark, as it does under prevailing practice.
(2) The "cost of capital" will partly be a function of the amount of capital
involved; hence, there is no single cost of capital. Paul Samuelson has put this
point well:
Suppose we agree to concentrate on cost of money Z. Is Z a constant?
Or is it rather a variable-a function of many complicated things?
Thus, there is not one definite Z needed to raise money from investors.
Surely investors have some sort of a supply schedule of funds against
the quantity Z. Only a stupid judge could believe that an award of
Z = $100,000 will be exactly enough to raise the needed amount of new
capital-wha' dat?-and anything less will raise nothing. Also, as we
53. Bonbright, Principles of Public Utility Rates 281 (1961).
54. Charles F. Phillips, Jr., author of Economics of Regulation (1965), in a letter
to the author dated June 7, 1966. Quoted with permission of Professor Phillips.
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economists know, even for a public utility, which is required to provide
certain standards of service, there is no unique needed amount of new
capital. If you keep people waiting for single lines, if you make them tolerate a certain number of delays, you can do with much less expansion
capital in the phone industry during the next ten years. If you desire to
give every back farmer electricity, you will need much more capital than
the utilities have ever thought of raising. So not only is Z a function of
to the
the new capital, but there is fundamental economic ambiguity as
point along this function at which things are to be evaluated. 5
(3) There may appear to be an element of circularity in the proposed rule
inasmuch as the market's capitalization of present earnings is in part a function
of prospective commission policy. It is true that there is an element of "interdependence" but this is not the same as "circularity" in the logical sense (as in a
tautology). Interdependent relationships are common in economics and are
handled frequently through the use of simultaneous equations. The same problem
exists at the present time when cost of money evidence is used to determine the
rate of return. The cost of money will certainly depend on the commission's final
rate of return on the given rate base.
An approximation to the solution of a set of simultaneous equations is to
get a schedule of costs of money, not just a single ratio, with various assumptions
as to what the final commission action will be. Each cost of money witness would
be asked, "What earnings-price ratio would be required to raise $X if the commission sets an earnings level sufficient to pay $Y on each presently outstanding
(i.e., old) share?" Similarly for $Y 1, $Y 1 , etc. within the relevant range. If the
commission is undecided (as it should be, until the cost of money evidence is in)
as to how much expansion to encourage, there might be a series of $X 1, $X11,
etc.
The interdependence is inherent in the regulatory process. What the company has to pay for money is strongly affected by what the commission does,
which in turn is strongly affected by what the company has to pay for money.
This is true at the present time and will remain true under our proposal. We are
not able to remove the interdependence but are merely proposing the removal of
certain abortive steps in the existing process (separate determination of rate base
and rate of return).
(4) An additional practical problem arises in separating a utility's earnings from utility and non-utility business. James C. Bonbright has kindly brought
this matter to the author's attention:
I am much interested in your point that there is really no need for
a rate base under a cost-of-capital or flight-of-capital standard of an
adequate rate of return. No doubt a scheme of rate making could be
devised-in fact, any of several schemes-which calls for no rate base:
for example, a maximum-dividend or sliding-scale dividend scheme
under which a utility may charge whatever rates will cover fixed charges
plus, say, 10 o dividends on par value. But, short of an arrangement
55. See supra note 13.
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under which the rate of dividends is set at a fixed amount... , any attempt to avoid a rate base would run into difficulties. Among these difficulties would be that of distinguishing between company capital
invested in the utility business and company capital invested in a nonutility business (as with the Canadian Pacific Railway). Even assuming
no such complication due to non-utility property, there would arise the
problem how to compute the total equity entitled to a return. Suppose,
for example, that a commission were to find that an anticipated return
of 10% will attract new equity capital. Without a rate base (or, at least,
without a balance sheet determination of the equity component of the
invested capital), I do not see how to determine the total allowable
earnings on the company's existing outstanding stock. But perhaps there
is some aspect of the problem which has escaped me. 56
(5) There is also a question whether the rate structure that would ensure an
adequate inflow of capital is the same as that which would prevent a flight of
capital.5 7 It is the former that is important in a growing economy. The commission presumably wishes the utilities to expand as the needs arise and as innovations become available. Merely to prevent a flight of capital is to ensure stagnation. Because of the factor of inertia it is reasonable to assume that a higher
return is necessary to attract capital than to prevent its flight. Thus the test
should not be "flight of capital" but the higher return of "inflow of capital."
The Supreme Court said in the Hope case, "The return to the equity owner
should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having
corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit
and to attractcapital."58 This supports the "inflow of capital" approach.
A New Mexico case is noncommittal on this point: "[W]hile the return for
the utility should be sufficient to enable it to obtain funds in the capital markets
in competition with other businesses of like risk, that return should be no
greater than necessary for that purpose." 59
56.
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VI. SOM[E ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
There is a departure from the social welfare optimum and the maximum
efficiency of the economic system if a rate of return is arbitrarily set at a level
which results in a return on capital which is different from the prevailing cost of
capital. If the rate of return permitted is too high, an excessive amount of capital
will be devoted to the enterprise; if too low, an insufficient amount. It has been
argued that the "fair rate of return" commonly used in regulatory control
induces a serious deviation from the optimal allocation of inputs. 0 As a result, a
proposal has been made for a "graduated fair return" whereby the rate of return
(assuming it is too high to begin with) is adjusted downward with successively
larger amounts of capital until it equals the (marginal) cost of capital.0 ' The
02
great research effort involved in making a correct adjustment is recognized.
My proposal 63 has been to go the whole hog and have the prevailing market
cost of capital determine the "end result" at the very beginning. There is no
point in devoting a great amount of energy to computing a rate base if the rate
of return is adjusted anyway to whatever extent is needed to obtain the desired
end result. By estimating the total amount of capital that is needed and what it
would cost to keep or attract it, we get the desired "end result" which is the actual
starting point for utility price-making.
We are dealing with industries which for one reason or another are regulated and not allowed to make voluntary decisions tending to maximize profits.
Certain logical consequences follow from that fact. To ignore them is to encourage
the wasteful and abortive exercises that the regulatory bodies and their wards go
through day after day.
Most of the problems that arise in the use of cost of money stem from
attempts to employ it as a method of estimating the fair rate of return. The
latter is then to be applied to the rate base. If we drop the "rate base-rate of return" approach most of the problems disappear. We need not find a percentage
cost of money, e.g., 5%, which will help set the fair rate of return which will be
applied to the rate base. The dividend yield (dividend/price expressed as a
percentage) and earnings yield (earnings/price expressed as a percentage), both
controversial items in this approach, relate dividends and earnings, respectively,
to the market price of the securities involved. The fair rate of return is applied
to another value entirely, the rate base. Only in extraordinary circumstances will
the market value of securities equal the rate base. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the rate of return determined from the cost of money leads to innumerable
60. Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 Am.
Econ. Rev. 1052 (1962). See also Wellisz, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipeline Companies: An
Economic Analysis, 71 J. of Pol. Econ. 30 (1963); Lerner, Conflicting Principles of Public
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477 (1966).
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contradictions and problems.6 4 In order to get a single cost of money percentage
figure, like 5%, we must be concerned with proper weighting, hence capital
structure and all the resulting complexities and inconsistencies mentioned above.
Under the pure cost of money approach proposed here we avoid these problems. We do not seek a single percentage figure. What we seek is a total number
of dollars that will meet the market's requirements for existing and needed capital.
This does not ignore the capital already sunk in the utility. The owners of that
capital are the owners of the outstanding securities. If we provide adequately for
the owners of securities we are ipso facto providing adequately for the owners
of the capital sunk in the business. We need not be concerned with the original
sinkers of capital. These may be long dead and gone or may have sold their
interests to others; or if they are still owners, they hold securities currently and
are adequately taken care of in the pure cost of money approach.
This is not to deny that there are problems even with the latter. If there is
a thin market for the securities involved it may be difficult to determine the cost
of money for the whole of the securities outstanding. This is a common problem
in the valuation of securities (e.g., for death tax purposes).65 The problems are
great but they are different from those involved in using cost of money for determining the fair rate of return to be applied to a rate base. At least the problems
involved in the pure cost of money approach deal with the crux of the issues
confronting a price-regulating body and not with a lot of irrelevant and abortive
issues such as what is the proper rate base and what is the proper rate of return.
In retreating to an "end result" approach based on "cost-of-money-alone"
we are actually relying on the old-fashioned rate of interest, the price paid for
capital. But the existence of regulation reverses the usual maximization process.
In an unregulated industry, the interaction of the functions of the marginal rate
of return on capital and the marginal price of capital will indicate the amount of
capital to be devoted to the enterprise together with the marginal (inferentially
also the average) price to be paid for the capital. In a regulated industry, the
amount of capital desired is somehow arrived at by the industry and somehow
modified by the regulatory agency, and only then is the price of that amount of
capital determined by the regulatory agency and used to set regulated rates which
will produce funds sufficient to pay that price. The cart is put before the horse.
But that does not necessarily make it unworkable. Have we not all seen one little
locomotive pushing a long string of railroad cars? That's the regulatory process.
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